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Abstract:   My task in this paper is to study Sartre’s ontology as a godless theology. The urgency of defending 
freedom and responsibility in the face of determinism called for an overarching first principle, a role that 
God used to play. I first show why such a principle is important and how Sartre filled the void that God had 
left with a solipsist consciousness. Then I characterize Sartre’s ontology of this consciousness as a “dualist 
monism”, explaining how it supports his radical conception of freedom. Then, by assessing Sartre’s 
dualist monism through a theological lens, I disclose an inconsistency in his thought concerning the idea 
that the in-itself is a deterministic plenitude, which presumes a theos different from consciousness and 
hence threatens monism. Finally I argue that his inconsistency originates from the finitude of Sartre’s first 
principle and analyze this finitude by examining the modes of temporality it implies. The entire trajectory 
problematizes the practice of theo-logy, the idea that a theos stands at the origin of the “logic” (organization 
or intelligibility) of everything such that all must be conceived under the logos of the theos. While Sartre 
forcefully criticized the theology of the infinite, his was nonetheless a theology of finitude.
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1  Radical freedom
In most introductory works, Jean-Paul Sartre is depicted as having endorsed a radical concept of freedom 
early in his career (that is, before writing Question de méthode [1957]): he seemed to contend that “freedom 
is without limits” and that “there are no degrees of freedom”.1 This is not a total misinterpretation, as 
Sartre’s own words corroborated it. For example, in Being and Nothingness he famously claimed that “we 
are condemned to freedom,” and this applies even to a prisoner.2 Such a freedom seems indifferent to the 
varieties of life-situations and, consequently, is not very informative on the socio-political level. If everyone 
were free without qualification, it would be pointless to promote freedom.
Upon a closer look, however, this charge is beside the point. Sartre distinguishes “to obtain what one 
has wished” from “by oneself to determine oneself to wish”.3 While we usually understand freedom as 
the former, which obviously comes in degrees, Sartrean freedom means only the latter: “success is not 
important to freedom.”4 Thus precluding any external limitation from compromising it, Sartrean freedom 
turns out to be absolute.
1  Bernasconi, How to Read Sartre, 47, 51.
2  Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 622-623.
3  Ibid., 621.
4  Ibid.
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So why would Sartre need this absolute concept of freedom? In Being and Nothingness it is inextricably 
linked with responsibility, since responsibility has no place in a completely deterministic world. As Paul 
Ricœur noted, I have to be the “author” of my acts so as to be responsible for them.5 If every act of mine were 
causally determined by things other than me, I would not be responsible for any of them. The significance 
of Sartrean freedom thus consists in its ethical appeal: if Sartre can show that a sense of freedom prevails 
over even the severest limitation, one can no longer exempt oneself from moral responsibility by referring 
to causal determination—be it physical, psychological or social—as many did in Vichy France.
This whole problematics reminds us of Augustine’s attempt to establish free will in the face of Hellenistic 
rationalism so as to accommodate the notion of guilt. It also recurred in Kant’s practical philosophy: while 
the phenomenal world is dominated by causal necessity, practical reason posits freedom in the noumenon. 
Kant said that he “had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith.”6 The common practice to 
establish freedom, therefore, entails clearing up, within the plenum of causal and material determination, 
a space of nullity where personal decision makes a difference.
Sartre’s ontology was no exception. This is evident from the apparent dualism in Being and Nothingness 
between the in-itself and the for-itself: while the in-itself constitutes “the plenitude of being and positivity”,7 
the for-itself arises only as a negation of, i.e., incoincidence with, the in-itself.8 Because being,9 as a 
plenitude, is determined by causal necessity, the site of freedom cannot be within being, but in a negation 
of being, i.e. in “nothingness”.10 Thus understood, the whole book of Being and Nothingness is about how 
an space of nullity is cleared up, so that freedom and responsibility can make sense.
Of course there are approaches to establishing freedom other than Sartre’s (rather traditional) move 
of clearing up a space of nullity. Michel Henry, for example, saw freedom as not only in the negation of 
being, but more fundamentally in a “softer” immanent being that predates the negation.11 Such a being 
Henry called “life”. Determinism was never so threatening to Henry as to Sartre, since for Henry it does not 
pervade the totality of being. Consequently, there was no need for freedom to retreat into a certain nullity.
On a second note, it comes as no surprise that ethico-political freedom was less important in Henry’s 
philosophy than in Sartre’s. Freedom for Henry was primarily a bliss, not an urgency. This brief comparison 
shows that even Sartre’s “theoretical” philosophy, i.e., his “phenomenological ontology” (the subtitle of 
Being and Nothingness), was very likely motivated by ethico-political concerns to begin with. The current 
paper will hopefully show that some of Sartre’s theoretical inclinations in Being and Nothingness can hardly 
be understood on the grounds of ontology alone, but is better explained with an urgency to establish human 
freedom in the face of determinism.
2  Dualist monism
Sartre’s notion of freedom has been controversial, not only because of its practical implications, but also 
because it is theoretically problematic. For example, if the tenor of his ontology were really the dualism 
just mentioned between the in-itself and the for-itself, it seems that freedom, though important, might be 
an illusion. For example, Sebastian Gardner argues that “it remains entirely possible that all of Sartre’s 
theory of nothingness, freedom, the mode of being of the for-itself, etc., is simply the expression of a 
systematic illusion: it is possible that Sartrean belief in the reality of everything over and above being-in-
5  Ricœur, “The Concept of Responsibility”, 14.
6  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B xxx.
7  Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 43.
8  Ibid., 100. Hence Sartre’s famous formula: “We have to deal with human reality as a being which is what it is not and which 
is not what it is.” (Ibid.) Here “what it is” refers to the human being considered as an in-itself, as a mere thing.
9  Here I am equating “being” with “being in-itself”. The two are not always synonymous in Being and Nothingness, as Sar-
tre sometimes conceives “being” as including both the in-itself and the for-itself. However, since he denies the for-itself any 
independent and separate being, the term “being” usually refers to the in-itself alone, except in the Conclusion of Being and 
Nothingness.
10  We will see later in this paper how this negation is possible at all.
11  Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 70.
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itself—everything which his ontology of the for-itself comprehends—is empty, and that in reality there is 
nothing but being-in-itself.”12 After all, if our acts were completely determined at the level of the in-itself, 
a level independent from whatever happens at the level of the for-itself,13 then freedom (belonging only to 
the latter) would become superfluous. A freedom that does not guarantee us the opportunity of making a 
difference to being-in-itself (either to our own bodies or to world situations at large) hardly has any practical 
significance that Sartre needed.
I suggest this line of objection in order to expose a deeper problem, a problem that indeed haunts 
every ontology. If we adopt a fundamental dualism about beings, then the communication between the two 
sides becomes philosophically unaccountable.14 If, however, we are thus tempted into a monism, in which 
one side is reduced to the other, then we are unable to answer the question why the phenomenal duality 
between the two, which has (wrongly) suggested a dualism, should arise at all.
Take for example the dyad pivotal in Sartre’s philosophy: (a) one’s free consciousness and (b) factical 
limits one encounters. In a fundamental dualism, we are unable to show what happens when a free 
consciousness encounters a factical limit. In a monism, either we reduce facticity to freedom, hence fail to 
explain why there appears to be limits to freedom, or we reduce freedom to facticity, hence fail to explain 
why there appears to be freedom despite all the limits. It seems that a simplistic ontological model, one 
that reduces the vicissitude of beings to certain static grounding domain(s), is bound to fail, be it dualist 
or monist.15
Faced with the dilemma between dualism and monism, Sartre made an ingenious move. Instead of 
construing the limits as extrinsic to the free consciousness, he made them intrinsic ones. Sartre writes that 
“it is […] our freedom which constitutes the limits which it will subsequently encounter.”16 In other words, 
the limits are imposed by free consciousness on itself, and indeed for its own sake.
How to understand this? Let us first consider what it is like for a freedom to be without limits. Though 
this freedom may access any choice, it finds no reason for preferring any particular choice to the rest; the 
moment it prioritizes a choice over others, freedom becomes limited by the particularity of the choice. Take 
the example of the souls in Plato’s Republic (an example Sartre himself made in Being and Nothingness)17: 
a soul may choose to become an Athenian, a Spartan, or an Egyptian etc., but this “absolute” freedom 
to choose what one is ends up abstract and empty until the soul actually chooses to be (for example) an 
Egyptian. Once this happens, however, there are limits that necessarily follow. To name one limit, the 
Egyptian that the soul has become would stand a very small chance of meeting Plato in person.
As the example shows, begetting factical limits is a precondition of concrete freedom. Freedom itself 
demands limits. In this way, there is no longer a need to reconcile between two sides that are separate in 
the first place. We start from a monist principle (freedom), but this principle comprises a moment of self-
disintegration, so that it has to invite its other.18 We are then able to explain why there appears to be a 
duality between freedom and facticity.
12  Gardner, “Sartre, Schelling, and Onto-Theology”, 261.
13  Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 787.
14  It may be argued that philosophy can nevertheless give a negative account of the communication between the two sides, i.e. 
it can give reasons why we cannot comprehend the communication. This may take the form of a weak claim or a strong claim. A 
weak claim is that the communication is incomprehensible within a certain explanatory framework, e.g. causality. But the claim 
of this “regional” incomprehensibility presupposes an underlying comprehensibility, usually within an alternative explanatory 
framework (e.g. phenomenological constitution), which, if articulated, would undermine said dualism: now the two sides can 
be grounded in one framework, and so the dualism here is not a fundamental one. A strong claim is that the communication is 
absolutely incomprehensible to us, whatever explanatory framework we adopt. But philosophically it is not very informative 
to claim on the one hand that there is something and to deny altogether its comprehensibility on the other hand—though I am 
aware that several philosophers have done so.
15  Early in his career Sartre already showed, under a slightly different problematics, that monism in the form of either realism 
or idealism is bound to fail. See Sartre, “Intentionality”, 4.
16  Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 620.
17  Ibid., 132.
18  In this paper, a non-capitalized “other” of something means quite generally what is not the thing itself. Capitalized “Other” 
means other people. This is in conformity with Barnes’ rendering in her English translation of Being and Nothingness.
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Thus construed, facticity is, only because of the demand of freedom to become more concrete, and 
in this way it is derivative of the free consciousness. It remains consciousness which encounters facticity 
and which continues to be its ontological basis. Nothing lies totally outside it. Sartre once claimed that 
“it is impossible to grasp facticity in its brute nudity”,19 meaning that facticity does not stand opposite 
consciousness as if independent but rather is a moment of consciousness itself and is always shaped by 
consciousness. This does not mean that facticity is illusory; it is real, but nonetheless subordinate.
There is yet another way to understand Sartre’s ontology, one that is more closely linked to the theme of 
theology. It concerns the curious concept “in-itself-for-itself” in Being and Nothingness. Sartre characterizes 
it as value,20 perfect being,21 the absolute,22 and, above all, the “Man-God”.23 The in-itself-for-itself does 
not exist as part of reality, but is non-thematically presumed by consciousness (the for-itself) as a haunting 
“normative existence”.24 The reason why Sartre has to posit the in-itself-for-itself is this. Recall that the 
upsurge of the for-itself is characterized as a negation of the in-itself, i.e., a movement in which the for-
itself dis-identifies with the in-itself, disclosing itself to be “what it is not” and to be “not what it is”.25 
Now, one precondition of this nihilation, Sartre says, is a “lack of being” on the part of the for-itself26, for 
otherwise the for-itself would not have to bother with the in-itself at all. (Here again we meet the abstract 
freedom detached from the factical world.) Specifically, this lack concerns the fact that the for-itself is not 
the foundation of its own being.27
If any lack can be defined with respect to (a) what lacks and (b) what is lacked, i.e., what (a) desires 
to be but in fact cannot, then it is clear in the current context that (a) is the for-itself. On the other hand, 
if the for-itself desires to be its own foundation but in fact cannot become so, then (b) would be an ideal 
being that is the foundation of its own being.28 That ideal being is exactly what Sartre calls the in-itself-for-
itself. Its name suggests (a) that it is inextricably tied to the lack, to the impossible desire of the for-itself 
to become the foundation of its own being and (b) that the way for the for-itself to (ideally) become the 
foundation of its own being is to beget a certain characteristic of the in-itself. That certain characteristic 
cannot be the utter contingency of the in-itself, both because the for-itself, too, is contingent, and because 
a contingent being, by definition, cannot be the foundation of its own being. What is it then? I suggest that 
it is the identity—or total coincidence—with itself, which is characteristic of the in-itself. The for-itself is 
defined as not this self-identity (which is why it is free), but as such it is prohibited in principle from being 
a foundation of its own being. Nevertheless, it strives to be that foundation, and the ideal being haunting 
(one may say motivating) this pursuit is the in-itself-for-itself.
Sartre’s characterization of the in-itself-for-itself corroborates my interpretation of his ontology as a 
dualist monism, for the following reasons. First, when Sartre introduces the notion of the “lack of being”, 
he emphasizes that this lack is not because an external being has expelled or removed something from the 
for-itself. Rather, the lack is a problem intrinsic to the for-itself, such that it is equivalent to the problem of 






24  Ibid., 143. Put in Kantian terms, the existence of the in-itself-for-itself is regulative.
25  Ibid., 100.
26  Ibid., 134.
27  Understanding precisely the meaning of “foundation” exceeds the span of this paper. Briefly, the brute in-itself is utterly 
contingent and hence not founded at all. The for-itself, by contrast, is the foundation of its own nothingness, but not the found-
ation of its own being. This means that the constant movement of nihilation (meaning-making) unique to the for-itself accounts 
for its persistence in time. This comes in accordance with Sartre’s move to abandon the metaphysics of substance, at least when 
it comes to the for-itself, and to replace the inert identity of the substance with a constant movement, a dynamic identity despite 
differences so to speak. However, that movement cannot account for the advent of the for-itself in the first place. In order to 
found its own being, i.e. its own advent, the for-itself would have to become an in-itself-for-itself—a causa sui in the traditional 
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into being only through lack; the in-itself can not be the occasion of lack in the in-itself.”30 In other words, 
were there only being-in-itself, the lack would not emerge at all; only the for-itself is capable of introducing 
the lack. Third, the relation of the in-itself-for-itself to the for-itself is “a total immanence which is achieved 
in total transcendence,”31 so, at bottom, the for-itself’s transcendence towards the in-itself-for-itself 
originates from, and remains grounded in, its own immanence. Fourth, the ideal that the for-itself strives 
towards, i.e., the in-itself-for-itself, is depicted in a sense of in-dependence and self-sufficiency: it is “a 
consciousness which would be the foundation of its own being-in-itself by the pure consciousness which it 
would have of itself.”32 At the end of the day, the engagement with the brute in-itself is only instrumental, in 
the sense (a) that it serves only the desire of the for-itself to found its own being and that (b) were that desire 
fulfilled—in fact it cannot be—the aim is again to be “pure”, to be purged of the contingency of the in-itself.
In summary, Sartre’s ontology, despite its dualist tonality, is essentially monist. This is why I term it a 
“dualist monism”.33
3  Godless theology
Sartre’s ontology gives us the image of a free consciousness that, for the sake of concrete freedom, must be 
“caught in its own snare.”34 Now, I would like to view this dualist monism through a theological lens. The 
aim is to make evident the price for Sartre of being a monist, and an inconsistent one at that.35
Upon first look, Sartre’s ontology could not be more distant from a theology. Not only did he focus 
almost exclusively on “human reality” instead of the God-human relation; when he actually mentioned 
God, he usually sounded dismissive. In fact, he did not even need to argue vehemently as an “atheist”36: 
most of the time he either (a) pointed out that the roles God played traditionally can in fact be fulfilled 
more properly by something originating from finite consciousness,37 or (b) showed that even if God exists, 
the structure of presence-to-itself, which is characteristic of the for-itself, would apply to God as well, and 
so God would necessarily be as finite and contingent as human beings38. In other words, God is either a 
misspelled name for certain aspects of human consciousness, or a being that, were it to exist, is essentially 
no greater than the human. Although Sartre did not go so far as to say that God is an illusion, it is doubtless 
that God is no longer an arch-principle in Sartre’s ontology, but rather one of its outcomes. This hardly 
30  Ibid., 136.
31  Ibid., 141.
32  Ibid., 723-724. My emphasis.
33  To be sure, there is another way to develop a dualist monism, i.e. to start from the material configuration of the world and 
see how it can develop into a free consciousness defying, or overcoming, material necessity. This can be found e.g. in Schelling 
in The Ages of the World, Hegel in Phenomenology of Spirit, or Bergson in Matter and Memory. But it was not an option for Sartre, 
both because his urgent aim was to make freedom a pervasive concept, and because he endorsed Husserl’s phenomenologi-
cal reduction and could no longer see material facts in a naïve way. For him, philosophy starts from questioning (Being and 
Nothingness, 35), and, because of this, anything we encounter has already been pigmented by this questioning. This explains 
Sartre’s choice of the term “facticity”—it is always the facticity of a certain consciousness and is never impersonal.
34  Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, 52.
35  As mentioned earlier, my main contention is that Sartre’s ontology is essentially monist, at least as it appears in his overall 
framework. I will argue later in this section, however, that his reduction of the in-itself to the facticity accompanying the for-
itself is incomplete, in the sense that a different theos inhabits the in-itself, so that the in-itself may be conceived as a determi-
nistic plenitude.
36  In “Existentialism Is a Humanism”, 53, Sartre pronounces that “existentialism is not so much an atheism in the sense that 
it would exhaust itself attempting to demonstrate the nonexistence of God; rather, it affirms that even if God were to exist, it 
would make no difference.”
37  Those roles include, for example, an ideal “self” towards which “human reality surpasses itself” (Being and Nothingness, 
139-140), which is exactly the in-itself-for-itself discussed at the end of Section 2; an extratemporal being which temporalizes 
instants that are themselves timeless (Ibid., 191); the source of a self-negation by which the Self encounters an Other (Ibid., 314-
315). In all these cases, Sartre argues that the notion of God depends on hypostatizing what is structurally intrinsic to finite 
consciousness into something transcendent to it.
38  For example, God is a contingent rather than necessary being (Ibid., 129); God “has the power to deny”, and thus cannot be 
“a being wholly positive” (Ibid., 150-151); God has to “wait for the sugar to dissolve” (Ibid., 191).
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involved any specific effort from Sartre’s side—living in a largely secular community in early 20th Century 
Paris, where it was religious belief, not unbelief, that would entail a deliberate personal commitment, 
Sartre was not really facilitating, but rather presuming, the “death of God”.
But if God was not really an issue for Sartre, why did he mention God in his ontological work at all, and 
quite frequently at that?39 The answer is already there in his treatment of God: he explained—or explained 
away—the notion of God, so that finite human consciousness may assume the ontological role God used to 
play. That role has been called the “first principle” (ἀρχή; primum principium) since Aristotle, and it stands 
for the source of a unifying order, i.e., an overarching organization, of all beings; without a first principle, 
different beings would fall apart and come into contradiction.
While post-Hegelian philosophers were often skeptical about positing a first principle in the traditional, 
monotheist, and largely Christian sense, Sartre was not so unorthodox as he tended to advertise himself. 
His effort to establish a dualist monism showed that he wanted to dispense with God while maintaining 
the ontological structure that refers every being back to the first principle. His first principle, the free 
consciousness, underlies each being as its precondition: the meaning-making activity of consciousness 
is a torchlight that defines the content and boundary of the world. In short, Sartre’s ontology implied40 a 
godless theology. There is a second but related sense in which Sartre’s ontology implied a godless theology. 
He needed a first principle, not only to give organization to his “phenomenological” ontology, but also 
(as we said in Section 1) to clear up a space of freedom within the plenitude of the in-itself, the locus 
of determinism, so that there may be genuine responsibility. Compared to Kant’s critical philosophy, the 
radicality of Sartre’s dualist monism consists in his contention that the “space of freedom” in fact expands 
to the whole world. The world is not divided into a section of determination and one of freedom; rather, it is 
constituted by freedom at its heart.41 In this sense, freedom is pervasive and absolute, so that no room is left 
for excuses people make about transgressing due to external determinations. Even if I had a gun pointed at 
my head, I am free to choose whether to obey and whether to do the right thing—after all, the world (or at 
least my world)42 originates from my free consciousness, and I am free to give meaning to that world, even 
if the way I give it meaning entails that I die, that I no longer dwell in that world.
It is illuminating to view this more “practical” orientation of Sartre’s dualist monism through a 
theological lens, because here, as in traditional theology, the first principle is normative, i.e., it not only 
describes how things are, but more importantly defines how they ought to be. This “ought” is not at once 
ethical, though it is the precondition of any concrete ethics.43 An ethically “right” configuration of the 
39  A brief search shows that the word “God” (capitalized) appears 77 times in Being and Nothingness and 29 times in “Existen-
tialism Is a Humanism”, a lecture spanning only 37 pages in print.
40  I do not think that Sartre’s ontology simply is a godless theology, considering that he distinguishes between ontology and 
metaphysics in the Conclusion of Being and Nothingness. The entire book is about ontology, the span of which is the same as 
transcendental philosophy in the Kantian sense, i.e. an inquiry into the preconditions of phenomena. Ontology points out 
those preconditions (e.g. the for-itself structure) without being entitled to answer why there are those preconditions at all. In 
other words, it takes for granted the advent of the transcendentals without bothering with their prehistory. The latter is left for 
metaphysical speculation, which can only be hypothetical and must conform to ontological findings. (Being and Nothingness, 
788-790) To Sartre, what I express here under the name of “theology” would certainly belong to the side of metaphysics. That is 
why I only claim that his ontology implies a certain theology.
41  Gardner, “The Transcendental Dimensions of Sartre’s Philosophy”, 49. In Sartre’s metaphysical fiction, the upsurge of the 
for-itself at the heart of the in-itself is “a tiny nihilation […] sufficient to cause a total upheaval to happen to the in-itself. This 
upheaval is the world.” (Being and Nothingness, 786. My emphasis.) The in-itself is not yet a world; the concept of the world 
entails a self-disintegration that the for-itself alone can accommodate.
42  Here I do not go into the complexities of a solipsism that Sartre seems to endorse. It is beyond the span of this paper. In the 
case I make here, it does not matter whether the world is shared with others or is only mine. After all, it is my life which is at 
stake.
43  In a section called “Ethical Implications” at the end of Being and Nothingness Sartre touches on the relation between his 
ontology and articulated systems of morality, which he calls “the spirit of seriousness”. He says, “the spirit of seriousness has 
two characteristics: it considers values as transcendent givens independent of human subjectivity, and it transfers the quality of 
‘desirable’ from the ontological structure of things to their simple material constitution.” (Being and Nothingness, 796) In other 
words, morality is a confused way to express the ethical implications of ontology: hiding behind deterministic relations, it is 
“ashamed of itself” and “has obscured all its goals in order to free itself from anguish.” (Ibid.)
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world (be it an individual act or a large-scale political institution) is first and foremost a configuration that 
observes the “ought”, i.e., “makes sense” within the overall organization derived from the first principle.44
In Sartre’s case, what is especially interesting is the relation between the first principle and the “ought” 
it defines. Instead of starting from a preconceived first principle in order to determine how things ought 
to be, he worked in the reverse direction. He started from an “ought” he posited apodictically, and that 
is everyone’s responsibility for the entire world. He then searched for a first principle that, ideally, yields 
exactly that responsibility. This resonates with Kant’s “practical” proof of the existence of God: God is, since 
otherwise the moral and social order would not hold. After the attack from F.H. Jacobi and Hegel, however, 
it was no longer an option for Sartre to endorse, like Kant, the first principle as a merely regulative idea.45 
Sartre had to show instead that his first principle is constitutive in the Kantian sense. It was for this very 
reason that God was no longer a candidate.
What remained available was the Cartesian legacy of a solipsist consciousness. Sartre had to endorse 
it, though he made significant modifications to the Cartesian model. Briefly, Sartre criticized Descartes’ 
model (and, according to him, Husserl’s as well) for prioritizing reflective consciousness, which is based 
on a dualism between what reflects (cogito) and what is reflected on (world), hence leading to the dilemma 
between realism and idealism. He suggested that a pre-reflective consciousness precedes any reflection. 
This pre-reflective consciousness may serve as a first principle, because, as a relationality that precedes any 
of its terms, it constitutes both the ego and the world by giving them meaning. An ego or a worldly entity 
may be discovered only because it has always already been grasped in a pre-reflective meaning-making 
activity.
Though I think the pre-reflective consciousness is legitimate as a first principle, i.e., as a source of the 
ontological organization of beings, I want to argue that Sartre was not fully loyal to this picture.
At issue is his conception of the in-itself in Being and Nothingness. If the pre-reflective consciousness 
were the only first principle, as Sartre’s dualist monism requires, it would follow that any organization of the 
in-itself must be derived from consciousness: left to itself, the in-itself would be a complete chaos devoid of 
concrete determination.46 But such is not always the case in Sartre’s characterization of the in-itself. Though 
he mentions “the opacity of being-in-itself”,47 suggesting that the in-itself lacks any intrinsic organization, 
44  Spinoza’s Ethics provides the most consistent example of this proto-ethical philosophy.
45  Jacobi (and also later Fichte) ridiculed Kant’s attempt to “save” God as hypocritical, since according to Kant there is no 
way to establish God’s existence with pure reason—in other words, God is, only because human beings need him for practical 
reasons. God thus construed is no longer the first principle; the first principle is rather the human subject that posits God for 
practical concerns. See Beiser, The Fate of Reason, 125.
Hegel further complicated the problem by criticizing Kant’s ban of theology from pure reason. According to Hegel, this move of 
Kant (which later led to the exigency of reintroducing God through practical reason) was problematic, since Kant rendered finite 
human understanding something absolute, giving it a definite boundary which it can never exceed, thus obscuring the fact that 
finite understanding is only a transient and intermediary stage and thus may “pass over into” the infinite idea of God in spe-
culative reason. See Hegel, Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God, 112-125; Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 105.
Although in Being and Nothingness Sartre made frequent references to Hegel, it shall turn out in this paper that his position, 
especially his “dualist monism”, was closer to that of Fichte. Like his predecessors Husserl and Heidegger, Sartre never failed to 
acknowledge the finitude of “human reality”, his translation of Heideggerian Dasein. Hegel’s reconciliation between the finite 
and the infinite would have sounded to Sartre as blatantly mystifying.
46  This idea may be exemplified either methodologically or ontologically. Husserl’s talk of an “annihilation of the world” 
[Weltvernichtung] in Ideas I suggests a methodological “parenthesizing” of the world of things [Dingwelt] that, rather than doub-
ting the existence of the things (a common misreading of Husserl), questions how they are given to consciousness as significant 
and meaningful. (Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, 60-62; 
109-110) Heidegger, on the other hand, gives an ontological account of how determinate meaning emerges from a primordial 
forgetfulness, or (in his later works) “nothing” [Nichts], or an undifferentiated “Earth” [Erde]. Both approaches imply that we do 
not take things in the world for granted, but rather turn toward their being (instead of non-being) as well as their intelligibility 
with wonder. Hence the “chaos” I put here is figurative: it does not signify a real chaos where every part of the in-itself has been 
examined and found to be chaotic; rather, it signifies an indeterminacy before any concrete determination, like it does in Greek 
myths.
47  Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 28.
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he says elsewhere (a) that it “has no need of” the for-itself48; (b) that it is “absolute plenitude and entire 
positivity”, in other words “the totality of the real”49; (c) that it is constituted by “causal series”.50
While (a) most obviously contradicts with the idea that the for-itself (consciousness) is the only first 
principle, (b) and (c) tell us more about Sartre’s reason behind. Let us start with (c). We have seen in Section 
1 that Sartre’s ontology is oriented towards defending freedom and responsibility in the face of determinism. 
This presumes that causal necessity predominates the in-itself. But isn’t causality also an organization—
and, more acutely, an organization that is not derived from consciousness? This is immediately reminiscent 
of Descartes’ conception of causality as the organization of res extensa, and his idea that the first principle 
of res extensa is not the cogito, but God.51 In the same vein, we can argue that there is another first principle 
(a contradiction in terms) underlying Sartre’s ontology, one that governs the in-itself and gives it an 
organization of causality. Due to (a), this first principle of the in-itself cannot be conscious ness, but has to 
be something else.52 Of course Sartre would not admit it to be God himself, but the overarching character of 
causal determination with respect to the in-itself strongly suggests an implicit assumption of a rationalist, 
Spinozean God, as was characteristic of enlightenment thinkers.53
Now, (b) only makes things worse. The ideas “plenitude” and “totality” suggest that the in-itself is 
fully articulated. We can speak of a “totality” only when we are (at least in principle) clear about each of 
its components.54 But to be fully articulated is to assume an organization that, again, predates the advent 
of consciousness. Moreover, the organization now extends to the entirety of the in-itself, so that nothing of 
the in-itself is exempt from the causal determination expressed in (c). Thus the first principle of the in-itself, 
which issues causal determination, turns out to be an absolute principle opposed to consciousness. In other 
words, in Sartre’s godless theology we find more than one “theos”, irreducible to each other. This is the 
moment of inconsistency in Sartre’s overall dualist monism.
To name a more consistent alternative, Heidegger took causality as an “ontical” [ontische] problem, 
which can only be understood when referred back to its ontological [ontologische] precondition, i.e. bringing-
forth [Her-vor-bringen] and revealing [Entbergen].55 Translated into Sartrean terms, this means causality, 




51  Descartes, Meditations, 35-36 (original Latin in Œuvres des Descartes, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, Vol. VII) / 25-26 (John 
Cottingham’s English translation).
52  Sartre insists, till the end of Being and Nothingness, that the in-itself has “ontological primacy” over the for-itself. (Being 
and Nothingness, 787) Contrary to Gardner’s contention in “Sartre, Schelling, and onto-theology”, 250, this is not a threat to our 
general characterization of Sartre’s ontology as a dualist monism derived from consciousness; otherwise, as I argued earlier, 
freedom would be illusory. Gardner’s characterization of Sartre’s ontology as “Parmenidean” is derived from his almost exclu-
sive attention to an opening section “Being-in-itself” (Being and Nothingness, 24-30) and a concluding section “In-itself and 
for-itself: metaphysical implications” (Ibid., 785-795), omitting what lies in between. Though his focus is well justified by an 
attempt to stress the ontological aspect of Sartre’s philosophy, which is more than often neglected (“Sartre, Schelling, and onto-
theology”, 248), what Gardner himself neglects is precisely the point that such an ontology serves the defense of freedom and 
cannot be properly understood without considering the latter, which appears in between the two sections he selects. In fact, 
those two sections do not belong properly to ontology (the theme of Being and Nothingness), but to metaphysics (see footnote 40 
above), and what Sartre suggests in them about the prehistory of the in-itself before the advent of the for-itself (hence the advent 
of the world) is at most fictional. It helps us see the inconsistency in Sartre’s own ontology as well as what worried him (and 
we will shortly), but it makes no threat to the “phenomenological”, which is governed by the dualist monism of consciousness.
53  Admittedly, many enlightenment thinkers, for example Pierre-Simon Laplace, were more or less atheists. But from an onto-
logical view they also gave an overarching organization to the totality of beings, and therefore their doctrines perfectly instan-
tiated what I call a “godless theology”.
54  For example, we may speak of the totality of natural numbers, because there is a method to derive any natural number by 
starting with 0 and adding up 1’s. In this way, though we are not clear about every natural number in fact, we are clear about 
every one of them in principle. Again, this “principle” implies an organization.
55  Heidegger, Being and Time, 234; Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology”, 6-23.
56  This is my gloss of late Heidegger’s esoteric terminology, but there are evidences that he was also concerned with the ma-
king of meaning when discussing the ontological precondition of causality. For example in History of the Concept of Time, 219, 
he claims that causality is a deficient mode in which we encounter the meaningfulness of the world.
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to hypostatize what are brought-forth and revealed, to make them into rigid causal relations populating an 
impersonal world.57 In this way, Heidegger denied any separate first principle to causal relations, giving 
them only a derivative status. Accordingly, he would never conceive the world as a “plenitude” or “totality”, 
but an unarticulated emptiness or forgetfulness.
Is there a reason why Sartre has to be inconsistent in this regard? I suggest there is. Recall that the 
free consciousness, which Sartre wants to make the only first principle, is characterized ontologically as a 
negation of the in-itself. As a negation, it presupposes something that is to be negated, which can only be 
what Sartre calls the “entire positivity” of the in-itself.58 In other words, the organization of the in-itself is 
needed as a background against which the meaning-making activity of consciousness constantly emerges.59 
But, as we have seen, the organization of the negated background undermines the dualist monism of 
consciousness, since it implies a first principle other than consciousness.
Furthermore, Sartre’s search for this negated background is exemplified in his somewhat gratuitous 
claim that the free consciousness is “totally unjustifiable” and contingent60—gratuitous in the sense that 
there is a logical leap. It is true that, as a first principle, consciousness has no further recourse. It does not 
follow, however, that it must be overtly contingent. A first principle can be necessary instead, as we see in 
the traditional conception of God as a causa sui. Or it can be neither necessary nor contingent, as we see in 
Heidegger: Dasein, though not a causa sui, is not eo ipso contingent, because in its average everydayness it 
does not strive to ground itself at all.
Sartre dismisses the first option by arguing that, even for a causa sui, the structure of presence-to-
itself involved in that reflexive “sui” entails a self-disintegration, which results in its contingency just as we 
witness in human consciousness.61 The second seems to have never appeared to Sartre as an option. In the 
section on the contingency of the for-itself, he says that the for-itself has “only a factual necessity; that is, it 
is the foundation of its consciousness-of-being or existence, but on no account can it found its presence.”62 
In other words, consciousness can only found, i.e., make ontologically intelligible, its persistence as a 
constant meaning-making activity, but cannot found the advent of that activity. Consciousness is indeed 
a first principle in that it founds all other beings, but the fact that there is consciousness at all is still 
groundless.
The question I pose to Sartre is however this: why even try? The way he starts with something “contingent” 
and looks for ever deeper “foundations” reminds us of the cosmological proof of the existence of God. Both 
are based on the conviction that everything ought to be founded, and in both cases the argument leads 
us gradually to the first principle. Unfortunately, the only first principle that was available to Sartre, the 
solipsist consciousness, ends up still too contingent for him. After all, that consciousness is temporal and 
singularized, unlike the eternal and omnipresent God. Thus the retrograde chain in search of a foundation 
57  Heidegger, Being and Time, 497; Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, 166, 184, 223.
58  This confirms Sartre’s aforementioned view that the in-itself “has no need of” the for-itself. He writes, “logically nothing-
ness is subsequent to being since it is being, first posited, then denied.” (Being and Nothingness, 47)
59  Though Sartre seems to side with Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (to name a few) on the priority of “the 
metaphysics of becoming” over “the metaphysics of being”, i.e. the idea that there is no inertia simpliciter in metaphysics and 
that for something to stay the same it must constantly become itself, it turns out at the end of Being and Nothingness that, for 
Sartre, the metaphysics of becoming applies only to the for-itself. The in-itself, by contrast, is still characterized by the me-
taphysics of being—to wit, by the inertia of matter. (Ibid., 787) As such, the in-itself conforms to the traditional metaphysical 
model of substance, except that it is constantly negated by the for-itself. But, as I am trying to show here, a negated substance 
is nonetheless a substance. The deterministic principle is like a theos that must be repeatedly decapitated, and the urgency to 
decapitate it stands for a lack, “an impossible vertical surpassing which by its very non-existence conditions the flat movement 
of consciousness.” (Ibid., 789) This almost mystical metaphor of a motivating nullity reveals the Freudian legacy in Sartre. It 
comes as no surprise that Sartre’s metaphysics can be illuminated from the negative theology of Kierkegaard or Karl Barth.
60  Ibid., 131-132. There Sartre writes that “[I] apprehend myself simultaneously as totally responsible for my being—inasmuch 
as I am its foundation—and yet as totally unjustifiable. […] In so far as this for-itself as such could also not be, it has all the 
contingency of fact.”
61  Ibid., 128, 789. Hence the claim that “God, if he exists, is contingent.” (Ibid., 129)
62  Ibid., 133.
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must stop at the solipsist consciousness, but ought not to. The ideal of an absolute foundation is “always 
indicated and always impossible.”63
In my view, this aporia, though only dimly in sight, may have induced Sartre to look elsewhere for a 
further foundation, even if that founding should take the form of a negation. In a footnote dialoguing with 
Hegel, Sartre submits that “the for-itself remains non-essential and contingent in relation to the in-itself.”64 
It seems that he wants the in-itself to be the further ground of the for-itself, albeit a negated one. For the 
in-itself to be a firm ground, then, causal necessity has to be smuggled through the back door, though 
Sartre would never admit it wholeheartedly, given his overall commitment to the dualist monism of the 
free consciousness. At the end of the day, Sartre was not that far from traditional foundationalists, and 
that temporal, singularized “god” of his ontology, the free consciousness, cannot claim to be the only first 
principle, but eventually has to give way to, or at least feed on (by way of negation), another god, i.e., the 
god of what Heidegger calls “naturalist rationalism”.65
4  The temporality of a finite theos
I have shown what the implications are for Sartre in adopting a “godless theology” where the theos (in 
his case the solipsist consciousness) is temporal, singularized—in a word, finite. Both temporality 
and singularity are crucial to the ontological account Being and Nothingness gives. The temporality of 
consciousness supports the basic structures of negation, presence-to-self, and projection, whereas the 
singularity of consciousness leads to Sartre’s impressive characterization of the encounter with an Other. 
Here we only have space to deal with the former in order to deepen the critique in the previous section, 
though we must bear in mind that those two aspects are interdependent and equiprimordial.
Considering Sartre’s dualist monism, there is a moment of self-disintegration that is rarely found in 
traditional ontologies. Sartre’s first principle, the free consciousness, has to invite its other so as to become 
concrete (Section 2). Its identity has to beget difference in order to persist as an identity. Insofar as the other 
here is considered to be the in-itself,66 Sartre has a reason to proclaim that “we have to deal with human 
reality as a being which is what it is not and which is not what it is.”67 In comparison, the traditional notion 
of God knows of no “other”. God is simply what he is.68
However, this self-disintegration of the for-itself is not just a deficiency that makes it “less” than a 
perfect first principle such as God. Quite the contrary, self-disintegration is necessary for consciousness (a) 
to be a free consciousness and (b) to be a first principle by way of meaning-making. It is precisely under the 
problematics of temporality that Sartre elaborates on these implications of self-disintegration. After all, to 
be temporal means to disintegrate, to become an other eventually.
Let us start with (a). Section 1 has shown that Sartre’s entire ontology is motivated by an urgency to let 
freedom and responsibility make sense in the face of determinism. Now, freedom has two elements: to be 
free from something, and to be free for something. Within Sartre’s discussion of temporality, the formula 
would be: consciousness is free from its past and free for its future.
When considering freedom in the context of action, Sartre says that facticity consists of “my place, 
my body, my past, my position, […] my fundamental relation to the Other.”69 If facticity signifies the other 
63  Ibid., 792.
64  Ibid., 145. My emphasis.
65  Gardner in “The Transcendental Dimension of Sartre’s Philosophy” (2010) claims that Sartre’s philosophy features an “op-
position […] to philosophical naturalism” (49). This is very true, as we have shown in Section 1. Here, however, I want to add 
that Sartre can be an anti-naturalist only because he is a naturalist as regards the in-itself. A god to be fought against is not any 
less of a god.
66  Thus we are leaving aside cases where the other of consciousness is another person, i.e. another free consciousness.
67  Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 100.
68  To be sure, there are accounts of God in which God also posits his other, most significantly in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philo-
sophy of Religion, 417-489. But there God is understood as the absolute Spirit, which at bottom is humane. Thus it is no longer in 
line with traditional accounts of God as transcendent. See also Hegel, Aesthetics, Vol. I, 534-539.
69  Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 629. My emphasis.
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posited by consciousness, and if the past is a moment of facticity, it follows that consciousness encounters 
its past as an other, that the past embodies the in-itself insofar as its span is defined by the torchlight 
of consciousness.70 The past is what it is. Freedom, then, entails a departure from this in-itself past, so 
that consciousness is “not what it is”, i.e., not totally convergent with its past. As Sartre says, “that heavy 
plenitude of being is behind me; there is an absolute distance which cuts it from me and makes it fall out 
of my reach, without contact, without connections.”71 Since my consciousness is a self-disintegration, a 
negation of the it-itself, I am my past only in the mode of having been it. As an it-itself, my past is impotent, 
unable to determine what I will be. The fault of determinism consists precisely in short-circuiting the past 
with the future, so that the former, qua in-itself, determines the latter with full necessity and immediacy. 
By contrast, Sartre insists that the for-itself is “diasporatic”.72 It hosts a radical break from the past, a break 
incompatible with the continuous and even flow of linear time, the time of determinism.
In what dimension of time, then, should we look for freedom? Sartre says, “in the past the world 
surrounds me, and I lose myself in the universal determinism; but I radically transcend my past toward 
the future to the same extent that I ‘was it.’”73 To be sure, this transcendence does not mean that one can 
arbitrarily change one’s past. To manipulate the in-itself at will is something even the free consciousness has 
no freedom for. However, one can always “choose the meaning” of one’s past.74 With this we are led to (b), 
i.e. the meaning-making activity. A clarification of it allows us to see what kind of freedom consciousness as 
a first principle enjoys, why freedom lies in the future, and why freedom and meaning-making necessitate 
a self-disintegration on the part of consciousness.
For Sartre, meaning is impossible without consciousness.75 Specifically, meaning arises from finality,76 
i.e., “a result to be attained”, which is unique to consciousness.77 However, a result to be attained does 
not yet exist. It is anticipated in a future, wide open, where the result may or may not be attained. When 
Sartre posits consciousness as the first principle on the grounds that consciousness makes meaning of 
every being, he means that each being is constituted according to the finality of consciousness, to what 
consciousness is about to attain. The example Sartre gives is climbing up a mountain: the rocks appear as 
easy-to-climb or difficult-to-climb only if consciousness posits a project to climb. To a consciousness that 
posits a different project, e.g., “the simple traveler who passes over this road and whose free project is a 
pure aesthetic ordering of the landscape, the crag is not revealed either as scalable or as not-scalable; it is 
manifested only as beautiful or ugly.”78 All these meanings are thus derived from the project, or “end”, of 
consciousness.79
We can now see in a temporal lens what freedom really means. The project provides an overarching 
framework in which alone everything acquires its meaning. But the project itself is never determined, either 
by one’s past as in-itself, or by the in-itself world at large, for what is projected “does not yet exist”80—
70  Hence Sartre says, “there is not first a universal past which would later be particularized in concrete pasts”; “the past is the 
in-itself which I am”; “it is through the for-itself that the past in general can exist.” (Ibid., 165, 173, 199. My emphasis.) The past 






76  The word “finality” does not appear quite often in Being and Nothingness. However, in Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, 
widely considered a prelude to Being and Nothingness, Sartre used the notion of “finality” to show that causal explanations 
of psychology missed the meaning of emotions because they prohibited any talk of finality. Sartre, Sketch for a Theory of the 
Emotions, 21-22.
77  Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 613.
78  Ibid., 627.
79  Thus construed, the Sartrean notion of finality is close to Aristotle’s final cause, except that the Aristotelian final cause may 
apply to any being while Sartrean finality only applies to being-for-itself. A closer candidate may be Heidegger’s “for-the-sake-
of-which” [das Worumwillen] in Being and Time, though Heidegger’s notion involves a re-appropriation of the past (tradition) 
that Sartre’s does not, at least not explicitly.
80  Ibid., 614, 621.
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namely, it belongs to a radically open future. It is thus the openness of the future that permits freedom to 
consciousness, that allows consciousness to be a first principle through meaning-making.
It remains to be seen why consciousness has that power of separating, as it were, its in-itself past from 
its radically open future. From the perspective of linear time, this is simply incomprehensible. But we have 
to recall that, for Sartre, both the past and the future are mine; they are conceived within the framework of 
dualist monism. So, the secret is in consciousness itself, specifically in its self-disintegration.
In a section titled “The Future”, Sartre says: “I project myself toward the future in order to merge there 
with that which I lack; that is, with that which if synthetically added to my present would make me be 
what I am.”81 Here, he expresses the idea that consciousness suffers a lack at its heart. Its present, when 
considered as in-itself, does not exhaust its being; there is something more to “what I am”. The lack can 
only be filled by a future self; “what I am” can be fully defined only with respect to “what I am going to 
be”. Thus, for consciousness to make meaning and to constitute beings, it must always go beyond what it 
already is; it features a non-convergence with its past (I am my past in the mode of having been it) and a 
finality towards its future (I am defined by what I am not yet).82 The moment of negation, here expressed in 
“non-convergence” and “not yet”, characterizes the self-disintegration of consciousness. Consciousness, in 
order to be a consciousness, must constantly become a new consciousness, whether or not it is qualitatively 
different from the “old” consciousness.83 For Sartre, this “newness” is more primordial than the newness 
of linear time: linear time “flows”, only because consciousness hosts a perpetual movement of self-
disintegration.84
Now we see how Sartre gives the mortality (being-temporal) and finitude of consciousness a positive 
role. It is precisely the self-disintegration of consciousness that (a) makes consciousness free from the past 
for the future and (b) lets consciousness be a first principle by way of positing a project which “does not 
yet exist” and make meaning of everything according to that project. In this sense, human being enjoys a 
freedom and a meaningfulness that God, traditionally conceived, does not: God’s consciousness would be 
self-identical, and its project would already exist (there is no distance between potentiality and actuality in 
God), and so the freedom and meaningfulness stemming from being-temporal would be unavailable to God. 
This includes, for example, radical changes in one’s life course, wonder about or disappointment with what 
newly arises, and self-esteem in one’s accomplishment within a limited lifespan.
Here a problem arises. In terms of its temporality, the self-disintegrating consciousness is dissymmetric: 
its past is absolutely fixed, while its future is absolutely not-yet fixed. As Sartre says, “if I can not re-enter 
into the past, it is not because some magical power puts it beyond my reach but because it is in-itself and 
because I am for-myself.”85 The temporal abyss is between a fixed being that I was and a radical openness 
that I will be. Nevertheless, consciousness has to bridge the two, to let one “flow into” the other, despite 
their fundamental discontinuity and heterogeneity.
Is Sartrean consciousness really capable of this? If my project, the source of my meaning-making, simply 
arises from a future which is yet nothing, isn’t my freedom—by which my consciousness posits the project—
again a most abstract one, just like the abstract freedom of the Platonic soul (Section 2)? Nothing of my past, 
of my life history or my social identities, is able to originally inform the positing of my project, for, in order 
to do so, my past would have to be appropriated under a ready-made project in the first place. Conceived 
as a fixed in-itself, the past can only be negated, i.e., taken up by a project alien to and independent of it, 
81  Ibid., 184.
82  Thus Sartre’s seemingly paradoxical claim: consciousness “drives us outside the instant toward that which it is in the mode 
of not being it.” (Ibid., 147-148)
83  For to remain the same is just to repeatedly become the same consciousness. As I expressed in footnote 59 above, Sartre 
applies the metaphysics of becoming to the for-itself.
84  De Warren in Husserl and the Promise of Time, 201-205, once expressed a similar idea when discussing Husserl’s “absolute 
flow of consciousness”. Though I am indebted to his formulation of “self-differentiation”, it is not very likely that Sartre was 
directly informed by Husserl’s account of time-consciousness. For one thing, there is no evidence showing that Sartre had 
access to Husserl’s Bernau Manuscripts on Time-Consciousness (1917/1918), which was not edited and published until 2001. For 
another, Husserl’s mature account of self-differentiation is neither dissymmetric nor unidirectional as self-disintegration is in 
Sartre, which we will shortly see.
85  Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 173.
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but can never inform that project. The self-disintegration of consciousness is thus not only dissymmetric, 
but also unidirectional. As a first principle, consciousness finds itself again in a desert of radical openness, 
without being able to make any concrete choice; like the traditional God, it must create ex nihilo.86
To be fair, Sartre can reply that one’s particular ends are informed by an “original project”,87 which, 
in turn, has always already been chosen.88 If the project has always already become concrete, it makes no 
sense to ask how exactly it becomes so. Consciousness does not first stand before a radical openness (hence 
emptiness) of the future so as then to make its choice. Accordingly, it is not a problem if its past can only be 
negated and cannot inform its choice originally.
This is very true. But isn’t it precisely the temporality of this “always already” that Sartre’s framework 
prohibits to address? For him, the past can be living (informative) or dead, but either way it is my past, it must 
have once been present to the meaning-making activity of my consciousness, for otherwise consciousness 
can no longer claim its priority as a first principle.89 By contrast, the “always already” of the original project 
is an immemorial past; to borrow Merleau-Ponty’s term, it is “a past that has never been present.”90
Think of birth: it is a past of consciousness that has never been present to it, since consciousness is only 
possible thanks to this birth. All the particularities that come together with birth already prepare a landscape 
for the consciousness that is born into them, so that one may have a concrete original project. One is born 
in a certain country, as member of a certain cultural community, into a certain family, and within a certain 
historical era. These are more ancient than the one born into them: for an individual meaning-making 
consciousness, they have always already been part of its horizon. Moreover, they inform and constitute that 
consciousness, albeit never in a fully deterministic way.91 Jean-Louis Chrétien has termed this immemorial 
past “an excess that founds me, that sends me and destines me, and is known to me only obliquely, in the 
excess of being.”92 Thus freedom, characterized by the radical openness of the future, remains abstract 
unless enveloped and informed by such an immemorial past.
The reason why Sartre has to keep this immemorial yet informative past at bay is parallel to the reason 
why he has to render the in-itself an opaque plenitude.93 Both originate from his dualist monism. Due to 
the constitutive primacy Sartre gives to consciousness, he is not entitled to talk about the immemorial past 
thematically, since that would allow the past to exist independently of any appropriating consciousness 
and would push his philosophy dangerously close to determinism. Similarly, the it-itself is opaque unless 
penetrated by a meaning-making consciousness and appropriated as the latter’s facticity. The paradox 
at issue is that Sartre both needs these ideas to give a complete account of consciousness and excludes 
them due to his dualist monism of consciousness. The result, as we have seen at the end of Section 3, is 
that consciousness turns out to be starkly contingent: in search of a ground, yet groundless in principle. 
Similarly, the finding of this section may be summarized thus: the free consciousness, in order to be 
concrete, is in search of an immemorial past that informs its choices, yet the constitutive primacy of the 
future-oriented “project” of consciousness precludes that immemorial past in principle.
86  Admittedly, this creation concerns only the meaning of things, not things themselves. But the point here is that neither 
version of the first principle is originally informed by a past.
87  Ibid., 583, 597.
88  Sartre sometimes equates this original project with Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world. (Ibid., 589) As such, the ori-
ginal project concerns one’s fundamental being, or what kind of person one is: it is “a certain choice which the for-itself makes 
of itself in the presence of the problem of being.” (Ibid., 587) Rather than being made till some point in one’s life, the choice is 
one’s life. When it gets problematized, one is already living, i.e. one has already made the choice. The discovery of the original 
project can only be post facto.
89  Ibid., 641-642.
90  Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 252.
91  Romano, Event and Time, 213-218; Event and World, 69-82. Romano there also expresses the idea that birth means that 
my meaning-making is ultimately rooted in being-with-Others. The link between the immemorial past and Others can only be 
treated in another paper.
92  Chrétien, The Unforgettable and the Unhoped for, 16.
93  Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 28.
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5  Conclusion: The limit of theo-logy
My effort so far has been to show how Sartre’s ontology, despite its atheist guise, remains a theology which 
refers the organization of every being back to a first principle—except that his first principle is the solipsist 
consciousness: finite, temporal, and singularized.
Here, theology is understood as theo-logy, the idea that a theos stands at the origin of the “logic” 
(organization or intelligibility) of everything, such that all must be conceived under the logos of the theos. 
This orientation is ontological and applies across different religious commitments, or lack thereof. I 
think it is close to what Sebastian Gardner calls “onto-theology”: “a philosophical position that regards 
the intelligibility of our and the world’s being as bound up metaphysically with the concept of a highest 
being,”94 though my notion is arguably broader than Gardner’s in that (a) I do not identify the theos 
exclusively with a theistic God and (b) I do not necessarily conceive this theos as “having at least some 
attributes of personality, mind, or subjectivity.”95
In traditional theo-logy, the theos is infinite and eternal. Its logos is therefore all-encompassing, which 
leads to a totalization of Being into one singular organization. The culmination of it was the rationalistic 
theo-logy of the Enlightenment, where, with the advance of mathematized natural science, the singular 
organization was found in deterministic causality. The generation after Kant, notably F. H. Jacobi, has 
found that the most consistent version of rational theology is Spinozism, a perfect monism in which all is 
determined.96 Human freedom, then, becomes trivial, if not eliminated, under such a view.
Sartre was well aware of the dead-end of traditional theo-logy, and in his own ontology he therefore 
tried to set up the free consciousness as the first principle—a first principle that is necessarily finite and 
temporal. However, the problem of theo-logy most probably did not appear to him as a problem of theo-
logy, since his alternative was still a theo-logy, albeit a godless one. Now it is consciousness that gives 
organization to beings by constituting their meaning. Moreover, Sartre’s account of the in-itself in an 
oblique way threatens to duplicate traditional theo-logy, especially its deterministic view of beings, setting 
it as what the positive part of his ontology must react against.
I am not claiming that the deterministic picture is fully articulated in Sartre’s account of the in-itself (if 
so, it would invalidate the monism of free consciousness). I am only claiming that an ambiguity underlies 
Sartre’s godless theo-logy. When the first principle is finite and temporal, the ontological map that grows 
from it necessarily leaves out something, which is turned into the posited “other” in dualist monism, into 
a formless shadow that can never be brought to light—after all, the light itself is finite and incapable of 
containing its other. This ontological residue, then, continues to haunt Sartre, and all he can do is to allude 
to it without explicitly crossing the boundary dictated by the finite first principle. Just as he alludes to 
the in-itself with the notion of “coefficient of adversity”97, he alludes to the immemorial past with the 
philosophical fiction of the in-itself attempting to “found” itself and thus becoming “a memory of being” 
in the for-itself.98
On top of all these, it is quite telling what life is like in his view: totally responsible, yet totally 
unjustifiable.99 The whole world weighs on one’s shoulders,100 while the one has no firm ground to stand 
on. After all, finitude is not a self-sufficient concept, but always presumes that which limits it. When a 
94  Gardner, “Sartre, Schelling, and Onto-Theology”, 267 (endnote 14).
95  Ibid.
96  di Giovanni, Freedom and Religion in Kant and His Immediate Successors, 143-145.
97  In Sartre’s example of trying to climb up a mountain, the coefficient of adversity refers to the fact that the mountain “res-
ponds” differently depending on one’s project to engage with it. (Being and Nothingness, 628) His central claim is that we cannot 
isolate the coefficient of adversity a thing gives as if it were independent of projects; rather, even to study it “neutrally” is a 
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godless theo-logy renders something finite an absolute principle, the “lack” we have seen in Section 2 
strikes back.
Of course, there have been alternative traditions in theology which did not give a totalizing picture of 
beings based either on an infinite theos or a finite one. In my view, however, those should more appropriately 
be called “religious thought” rather than “theology”, as they do not attempt to derive all beings from God 
in a definite, “logical” way. We have to distinguish between (a) what the name “theology” entails and (b) 
historical practices under the banner of “theology”. The name “theo-logy” applies only to the former.
If a theo-logy of infinitude leads to lifeless determinism, and if a theo-logy of finitude leads to an uncanny 
and restless life, what instead would make room for a blessed life, concretely free, yet not overburdened by 
unjustifiability? My view is that theo-logy, as I characterize it, must be overcome by a theos that does not 
exhaust the world in its logos. Instead of excluding its other, be that human freedom (hence the possibility 
to falter) or nature (hence the risk of bondage), it must be able to contain its other without thereby being 
overwhelmed by it.101 The world must stand mistakes and unfreedom, but in such a way that they are only 
intermediary and transient. Whether we characterize that “theos beyond theo-logy” as finite or infinite, 
however, remains an open question.
Though my discussion in this paper cannot say much about the general relation between philosophy 
and theology, it helps us see philosophy’s long-lasting entanglement with what I have called “theo-logy”. 
To philosophize means to try to give organization and intelligibility to beings, which is why philosophy 
frequently ends up giving theo-logical—that is, totalizing—accounts. But philosophy is arguably more than 
that, since, by articulating certain theo-logies, it is able to see their limits and to overcome them, though 
not without the risk of running into another theo-logy. Sartre’s struggle with determinism is a case in point. 
Figuratively, one can say that theo-logies are the steps philosophy has to take, but philosophy itself cannot 
be identified with any definite step; it is a restless movement.
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